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Conspiracy and the First Amendment
Throughout various periods of xenophobia, chauvinism, and col-
lective paranoia in American history, conspiracy law has been one of
the primary governmental tools employed to deter individuals from
joining controversial political causes and groups.' A number of the
resulting cases have achieved a good deal of notoriety in legal annals
for the first amendment doctrines they fostered,2 but courts and com-
mentators have paid surprisingly little attention to the effect of con-
spiracy law itself on first amendment rights.
In the political conspiracy cases, the essential offense was that a group
of individuals had banded together to engage in advocacy which the
legislature had designated criminal.8 Reviewing courts did not question
1. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (individuals opposed to Ameri-
can involvement in World War I indicted for conspiring to cause insubordination in
armed forces by circulating anti-draft documents); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 857
(1927) (leading socialist indicted and convicted for being a member of a conspiracy to
advocate criminal anarchy). During the McCarthy era several leaders of the Communist
Party were indicted for conspiring to advocate violent government overthrow. &'c Denn
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
It is, of course, easier to understand past episodes of political repression for what they
are than it is to recognize contemporary patterns of governmental efforts to restrict polit.
cal expression and association. There are, however, a number of current examples of the
use of conspiracy law to attack controversial political and social groups. See, e.g., United
States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (Ist Cir. 1969) (five leaders of anti-Vietnam War movement
indicted for conspiring to counsel, aid and abet young men to avoid the draft); United
States v. Dellinger (N.D. Ill. 1970) No. 69 CR 180 (eight leaders of anti-war et al. forces
protesting the Democratic National Convention in Chicago indicted for conspiring to cross
state lines wtih intent to incite a riot).
2. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), where the Court first elaborated
the "clear and present danger" test, and Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 491 (1951),
where the Court "modified" the clear and present danger test to read: "whether the
gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such Invasion of speech as
is necessary to avoid the danger." Id. at 510. See also Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(1957). The Court there held that the advocacy of ideas could not be punished, though
the first amendment permits punishment of advocacy of illegal action. In both SChnck
and Dennis the Court affirmed the convictions of all the defendants; and in none of these
cases did the Court subject the use of conspiracy law to regulate individuals engaged
in unlawful expression to first amendment analysis.
3. See cases cited in note 1, supra. Advocacy of government overthrow, counseling
draft resistance, and inciting to riot are forms of allegedly unlawful expression. In Spoch,
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the constitutional validity of applying conspiracy law to such conduct'
until Judge Coffin, dissenting in United States v. Spock, suggested that
in certain circumstances the first amendment bars the use of conspiracy
law. In his view it is constitutionally impermissible to use the conspiracy
weapon to attack "agreements" in which: (1) the effort was completely
public; (2) the issues were in the public domain; (3) the group was
ill-defined; (4) the purposes of the "agreement" were both legal and
illegal; and (5) the need for additional evidence to inculpate is recog-
nized.5
Judge Coffin's ground-breaking opinion is important as a first attempt
to grapple with the conflict between conspiracy law and the first
amendment. But there are tvo reasons why his five-part "outer limits"
cannot serve as a rule to reconcile the conflict in future cases. First,
such a rule would suffer from the same troublesome lack of clarity that
characterizes conspiracy law itself. Second, Judge Coffin's limits leave
certain forms of associations unprotected when first amendment prin-
ciples should require a contrary result.7
I.
Professor Emerson, in his Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, has offered at least four interrelated reasons for the pri-
ority of first amendment rights in the American legal system.6 First, the
not only was the conspiratorial purpose framed in terms of expression, but the overt
acts consisted of several public speeches, a document entitled "A Call to Resist Illegitimatc
Authority," and a press conference. See MrrroPD, ThE TREAL OF DR. Spocm 254-55 (1969).
The overt acts alleged in Dennis and Yates were also framed in terms of expression such
as teaching violent government overthrow.
4. In the Spok case, the majority noted that conspiracy law had been used historically
as a means of deterring and punishing those who increase the likelihood of crime by
concerted action. 416 F.2d at 171. The law of conspiac--and the law of inchoate aimes
in general-developed quite independently of first amendment case law, however, and
the majority ignored the obvious point that historical acceptance of a legal practice does
not forever establish its validity. See T. Emerson, TrE SxsTrFx OF FRamo. or Exrnas o.
402 (1970).
5. 416 F.2d at 186.
6. One is entitled to ask, for example, how many people have to be aware of the
"effort" and the "issue" before it becomes "public." Further, hen is a group "ill.de.-
fined" as opposed to discplined and coherent? Judge Coffin's ad hoc formula ma)y suit
the facts of the Spock situation, but it is not very useful as a rule for future application.
7. For example, Judge Coffin states that the defendants in Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951), would not be protected because their agreement was clandestine
and their conspiratorial objective was a form of advocacy specifically outlawed by the
Smith Act. 416 F.2d at 185, n.3. The objective of the Dennis conspiracy uas, however,
allegedly unlawful expression, and, as this Note illustrates, the first amendment should
require that there be no conspiracy charge in such a case.
8. See T. Emerson, TowAs A GENRnAL. THEORY or TnE Fisr Awmn'.%sEsxr 1-15 (1963).
72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-886; see also Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of
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right of free expression is essential to an individual's self-realization,
to the development of his "character and potentialities as a human
being."9 Suppression of this right constitutes an affront to the dignity
of the individual. Second, free expression is invaluable to a society
devoted to the attainment of truth.10 In Learned Hand's words:
[The First Amendment] presupposes that right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritarian selection. To many this is, and
always will be folly; but we have staked upon it our all."1
Third, free expression is a requisite for a democratic society because
it provides "for participation in decision-making through a process of
open dicussion which is available to all members of the community."'1
Finally, freedom of speech promotes the rational compromise essential
to a viable democracy; it is "a method of achieving a more adaptable
and at the same time more stable community, of maintaining the pre-
carious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."1 a
A legal system which strongly endorses freedom of expression and
its underlying values should also protect the individual's right to as-
sociate with others of like mind in order to make his expression of
opinion more effective. It is no feat of judicial invention for the Su-
preme Court to discern a right of free association in the nexus between
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.' 4 But since the first amend-
Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964); T. EMERSON, TuE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXIRuSSioN
(1970).
9. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YAIa LJ. 877,
879 (1963). As Milton said of licensing of the press, it is "the greatest displeasure and
indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put upon him." J. MiLToN, Avi,O-
1,AGrncA 21 (Everyman's Library ed. 1927).
10. Emerson, supra note 9, at 881.
11. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 862, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
12. Emerson, supra note 9 at 882. A democratic society derives its powers from the
consent of the people, and freedom of expression is a fundamental check on whether that
consent is forthcoming. See A. MIEKLEJOHN, POLrITCAL FRE,.OM (1960). See also, De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937); and Comment, Black Power Advocacy: Criminal
Anarchy or Free Speech, 56 CAL. L. REv. 702, 742-43 (1968).
13. Emerson, supra note 9 at 884. See also Bagehot, The Metaphysical Basis of Tolera-
tion, in 2 WORKS OF WALTER, BAGEHOT 339, 357 (Hutton ed. 1889): "Persecution in Intel-
lectual countries produces a superficial conformity but also underneath an Intense, Inces.
sant, implacable doubt." Suppression of expression promotes inflexibility and stultifica-
tion; as a result, society is unable to adjust to changing circumstances. If a society values
rational compromise, as a democratic one should, freedom of expression is essential.
14. See N.AA.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958):
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controver-
sial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than
once recognized by remarking upon the dose nexus between freedoms of speech and
assembly .... It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom
of speech.
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ment does not afford absolute protection to all forms of individual
expression,1 5 it could hardly be claimed to offer full protection to all
forms of association.' 6
When the government seeks to regulate associations whose primary
activity is expression, a tension results between the regulatory provisions
and the first amendment. The resolution of this conflict depends on
both the nature of the regulation and the nature of the expression. As
a form of regulation, conspiracy law is extremely broad, and conspiracy
trials are striking for their chaotic procedures which favor the prosecu-
tion's case.
Analysis lends credence to Justice Jackson's observation that the
substantive law of conspiracy "is so vague that it almost defies defi-
nidon."' 7 At common law, an indictable conspiracy was apparently
an agreement either to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by
unlawful means.' 8 This peculiar notion that an agreement should be
punishable even though its objective is legal is somewhat explained by
the two rationales underlying conspiracy law-the "specific object
rationale"' 9 and the "general danger rationale."20
Under the "specific object rationale" the conspiratorial agreement
is viewed as an inchoate offense, analogous to an attempt.2 ' The agree-
ment of a group theoretically makes it more probable that the con-
spiratorial objective will be completed than if one person acted alone.
Under this rationale, the agreement is logically punishable only
Thus, freedom of association may often be as important in first amendment terms as
freedom of expression itself. See Wyzanski, The Open Window and the Open Door, "5
CA!.. L. REv. £36, 347 (1947).
15. See e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Brandenburg v. Ohio, S95 US.
444 (1969). The term "expression" as used in this Note is not used in the same sense in
which Professor Emerson uses the term. See Emerson, supra note 9. Professor Emerson
divides all conduct into two classes: "expression" and "action." "Expression" as he uses
it, demands absolute protection from governmental regulation. Professor Emeron clas-
sifies incitement to violent acts as a form of "action." In this Note, however, "expresion"
means a]1 words (and even some expressive conduct; see note 90 infra) the illegality of
which the courts may determine only through reference to one of tue three first amend-
ment tests: the dear and present danger test, the incitement test, and the balancing test.
See p. 879 infra. Thus, words which incite to violent action would constitute "expression"
for the purposes of this Note.
16. See eg., Barenblatt v. U.S., £60 US. 109 (1959); Gibson v. Florida Legislative In-
vestigation Comrm., 572 U.S. 539 (1963).
17. Krulewitch v. United States, £36 U.S. 440, 446 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
18. This is the oft-cited definition of an indictable conspiracy set forth by Lord Denman
in King v. Jones, 110 Eng. Rep. 485, 487 (K. B. 1832).
19. This term is borrowed from Note, Developments in the Lam-Criminal Con-
spiracy, 72 HAv. L. REv. 920, 925 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
20. This term is also borrowed from Developments, supra note 19, at 925.
21. See WRmGHT, LAW OF CRsm'NAL CONSs'mACUS 56, 62 (1887); 2 STmxN, HEsror- oF
THE CsusNAL LAW 227. Justice Holmes pointed out, however, that conspiracy law attacks
inchoate conduct at a far more incipient stage than does the law of attempts. Hyde v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347, 387-88 (1912).
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if the conspiratorial objective is a crime.22 Furthermore, as in the com-
mon law of attempts, the conspirator who completes the substantive
crime is punishable for the agreement or for the completed offense,
but not for both.23 Were the specific object rationale the only justifica-
tion for punishing conspiracies, the scope of the crime would seem
relatively clear, but the "general danger rationale" clouds the matter
considerably.
Different theorists have based the "general danger" rationale on
one of two propositions. First, and most prevalent, is the common law
view that combinations can be punished, whether or not their objective
is unlawful, on the theory that such group action creates a pervasive
anxiety in society.24 Two individuals can be convicted for agreeing to
do an act which, if accomplished by one individual, would not even
be indictable.25 Not only have several commentators questioned this
notion of the general danger rationale on historical grounds, 0 but
22. Under the law of attempts, the inchoate stage of conduct cannot be punished
unless the objective is unlawful. See generally Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of
Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute, 61 COLUM. L,
REX'. 571, 619 (1961). When considered alone, the "specific ob ject" rationale supports thle
analogy between conspiracy and an attempt, and the two should be treated similarly
for purposes of criminal regulation.
23. See, eg., Remington & Joseph, Charging, Convicting and Sentencing the Multiple
Criminal Offender, 1961 Wis. L. RMv. 528 (1961). If conspiracy is treated purely as an
attempt (as it should be if the specific object rationale is the only justification for the
conspiracy), then the theory of attempts suggest that either the inchoate conduct or tile
completed offense may be punished, but not both. As Remington and Joweph note:
The prohibition against conviction of both an attempt and the completed crimte
necessarily follows from the proposition that it is improper to convict [an individual]
of crimes based on the same conduct unless each requires proof of a fact not required
by the other. Since the attempt does not require proof of any fact not required for
conviction of the completed crime, conviction for both is improper.
1961 WXis. L. RaV. at 546.
A broader reason for this result lies in the fact that every person who succeeds In com-
mitting a substantive offense has, at an earlier time, engaged in an inchoate state of that
offense. The notion is that it would be wrong to inflict double punishment on the person
for engaging in several stages of the same continuous line of conduct. See Wedsler, Jones
S. Korn, supra note 22, at 1030.
24. Developments, supra note 19, at 925; see also Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 22,
at 964.
25. Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 21, at 964. Quoting State v. Kemp, 126 Conn.
60, 78, 9 A.2d 63, 71, 72 (1935), Wechsler, Jones & Korn note:
It is not essential ... to criminal liability that the acts contemplated should consti-
tute a criminal offense for which, without the elements of conspiracy, one alone could
be indicted . . .[]t will be enough if the acts contemplated are corrupt, dishonest,
fraudulent, or immoral, and in that sense illegal.
See also Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YAMa L.J. 405, 413 (1959).
This notion accounts for the somewhat surprising fact that an agreement to accomplish
a misdemeanor may be punished as a felony. See Developments, supra note 19, at 911,
See also State v. Coolidge, 106 Vt. 183, 191-192, 171 A. 244, 248 (1934). Further, a conspl-
rator can be punished for both the agreement to commit an unlawful act and the
accomplished offense itself. See Developments, supra note 19, at 969.
26. See, e.g., Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REv. 393, 405 (1922). Sayre clains
that Lord Denman's epigram was merely a "magic jingle" which had no basis in the
common law.
876
Conspiracy and the First Amendment
the authors of the Model Penal Code rejected it because it fails "to
provide a sufficiently definite standard of conduct to have any place in
a penal code."27 The Code defines conspiracy as "an agreement to com-
mit a crime. -"28 The authors of the Code suggest, however, that a con-
spiracy may create a "general danger" if the combination has "criminal
objectives that transcend any particular offenses that may have been
committed in pursuance of its goals."2 9 In such cases and only in such
cases, the conspirators may be punished for both the agreement and
the offenses already achieved.30
The Code's authors have constructed a more justifiable notion of
the general danger rationale, but the federal courts and most state
courts persist in following the common law notion,3 ' and fail to an-
alyze conspiracy indictments to determine whether the general danger
rationale is unjustified in the case at hand.
A precise delineation of the scope of the crime of conspiracy is, then,
extremely difficult. Procedurally, however, the defendant in a conspir-
acy trial dearly suffers distinct disadvantages-distinct enough to in-
duce one court to term conspiracy the "darling of the modern pros-
ecutor's nursery."33
It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the existence of
the conspiratorial agreement. However, on the theory that conspirator-
ial agreements are secret and hence seldom susceptible to direct proof,
courts relax the normal rules of evidence.3 4 Perhaps the best illustration
of this phenomenon is the "conspirator rule," under which hearsay
declarations by one co-conspirator are admissible against all co-conspir-
ators on the grounds that the admission of hearsay--though "inherently
less reliable than other evidence" 3 -- is thought necessary in order to
have any evidence at all.m
27. See Wechsler, Jones & Kom, supra note 22, at 904.
28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962): (1) Definition of
Conspiracy. A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit
a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(a) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will
engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit
such crime; or
(b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of sudl
crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.
29. W*rechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 22, at 960.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 963, 964. See also Note, The Objects of CHiminal Conspiracy-Inadquacies
of State Law, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1056 (1955).
32. See Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, GS YALc. UJ. 403, 413
(1959).
33. Harrison v. United States, 7 Fg2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
34. See Developments, supra note 19, at 984.
35. Id. at 989.
36. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 AficH. I. REv. 1159, 1160 (1954). The co-coaspi.
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Defendants in conspiracy trials suffer other disadvantages as well.
The standard of relevancy is greatly reduced,"' and the volume of
evidence produced by a trial of several defendants may overwhelm the
jury. Furthermore, the jury may "infer an association among the defen-
dants merely from the fact that they are being tried together."88 And
finally, the Supreme Court has held that an individual found guilty
of a conspiracy may also be held liable for the commission of the sub-
stantive offense even though he did not personally participate in that
substantive offense.3 9
Both substantively and procedurally, then, conspiracy law is a rather
sprawling prosecutorial weapon. Yet, neither the Supreme Court nor the
Spock majority have recognized any first amendment problems in the
use of conspiracy law to attack associations engaged in expression.
II.
Conspiracy laws strike at conduct in a very nascent form. Though
the federal conspiracy statute and many states require that the pros-
ecution establish an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,4 this re-
quirement is seldom more than a formality,4' and an indictment may
be brought well before the conspiratorial objective is achieved. When
the conspiratorial objective is unlawful expression, however, settled
first amendment doctrine should require the dismissal of a conspiracy
rator rule, and its application, are thoroughly analyzed in Developments, supra, note 19,
In theory, the out of court declarations of a co-conspirator may be used as evidence against
each conspirator only if the prosecution establishes a foundation for such admission by
independent proof of the agreement. But in fact, trial courts do not require such Inde-
pendent proof before admitting the hearsay evidence. Thus, the hearsay Is admlttcd
"provisionally," subject to a later instruction by the court to disregard it against all but
the dedarant if the prosecution fails to present independent proof of the agreement.
Needless to say, such instructions are probably psychologically impossible for the jury to
obey; see Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring),
but they are not often necessary because trial courts are prone to find proof of the agree.
ment on very weak evidence indeed. See, e.g., Pressley v. State, 205 Ga. 197, 53 SXE2d 100
(1949) (prima fade proof of a conspiracy to murder established merely by the fact that
the defendants were seen at the scene of the crime looking for food and lodging).
37. See Developments, supra note 19, at 988.
38. Id. at 980.
39. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). See generally, Developments, supra
note 19, at 993-1000.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1965); see, e.g., Aruz. STAT. ANN. § 13-332 (1956); CAL. PrN. CoDE
§ 184 (West 1955); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 583 (McKinney 1957). See generally I. MincuAzi, &
H. WECHSLER, CRiMINAL LAW AND ITs ADMINISrRATON 637 n.6 (1940).
41. See Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 GEo. LJ. 328, 338 (1947): "The courts
somehow discover an overt act in the slightest action on the part of the conspirators." Vor
example, see Smith v. United States, 92 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1937), where the overt act was
established by a telephone call. The overt act or acts alone need not constitute crhnlnal
conduct. Pollack argues that as a result, there is no real distinction between the common
law conspiracy cases (which required no overt acts) and cases under the federal statutes.
878
Vol. 79: 872, 1970
Conspiracy and the First Amendment
indictment brought prior to the completion of the conspiratorial
objective.4 The reason for this result lies in the nature of expression
as an offense.
While the Supreme Court has never held the right of free expression
to be absolute, it has over the years gradually broadened its conception
of the reach of first amendment protections. In doing so, the Court
has employed three constitutional tests-the clear and present danger
test, the incitement test, and the ad hoc balancing test. The operation
of these tests is commonly understood and need not be reiterated."3
What is especially significant about the tests here is that analysis of
each reveals that, regardless of which test is used, the court, both at
the trial level and on appeal, must examine the expression in the con-
text of the surrounding circumstances of each case before it can decide
whether that expression may be constitutionally punished. Thus, in
Edwards v. South Carolina,4 4 the Supreme Court reversed the breach
of the peace convictions of black student demonstrators not on the basis
of an incorrect first amendment test employed by the state court, but
on the basis of its own "independent examination of the record."45
Under the dear and present danger test or the incitement test, the
court must closely examine the speech, the manner of its delivery and
the circumstances that obtained at the time of the speech in order to
determine whether it may constitutionally be punished. Under the
balancing test, however, the factors that go into the balance are often
not the circumstances of the particular exercise of first amendment
rights, but the more abstract general governmental interests advanced
by the legislation and the adverse effect of the legislation on a class of
expressive associations or conduct. But the balancing test has not been
42. The government could not validly level a conspiracy indictment against a combina-
tion engaged only in lawful expression, despite the implication of the "general danger"
rationale. See N.AA.C.P. v. Alabama ex tel. Patterson, 357 US. 449 (1958); note 14 supra.
43. For a discussion of these tests see Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, supra note 9, at 907-16. The incitement test is the most current standard
by which the Court will examine governmental regulation of expression. Cf. Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969):
T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except wvhere such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.
See also T. E.MisoN, TBE Sysrm OF FMrmoss OF ExPRrssION 404 (1970).
44. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
45. 372 U.S. at 235. See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Speiser v. Randall,
357 US. 513, 521 (1958). The Edwards Court claimed to distinguish the facts presented
from those in Feiner v. New York, 340 US. 315 (1951). but actually the full-revier". ap-
proach of Edwards represents a radical departure from the Feiner Court's refusal to ex-
amine both the record of the expression and the lower court's reliance on the word of
the arresting officer.
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employed by a majority of the Court in cases involving direct regulation
of the content of a public speech. The Court uses the balancing test
when governmental regulation impinges indirectly upon first amend-
ment freedoms of expression and association.46 Those members of the
Court who have advocated the use of the balancing test in cases where
expression is subject to direct limitation have, in essence, suggested a
scheme of analysis quite similar to that required by the other two tests.
The content of the expression, they claim, must be analyzed in the con-
text of the surrounding circumstances, and the competing interests
weighed to determine whether the regulation of speech is justified.
4 7
The important conclusion that the Court's three modes of analysis
demand is that unlawful expression is itself an inchoate offense. The
harm the legislature may act against, if there be any, lies not in the
speech itself, but in the actions which the expression may precipitate.
48
46. See Note, Civil Disabilties and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842, 847 n.16
(1969). The Court has generally applied the balancin test to the so-called "Indirect"
cases where the content of the speech is not subject to direct governmental regulation:
[G]eneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but In-
cidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law
the first or fourteenth amendment forbade Congress or the states to pass, when they
have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a )rerc-
quisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the govern-
mental interest involved.
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961). See also Frantz, The First Amendnent
in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), the Court applied what, at first blush,
appeared to be a balancing test to determine whether speech could be directly regulated.
The Court considered four possible state interests in so regulating speech contemptuous
of the American flag: 1) an interest in preventing incitement to violence; 2) an interest In
punishing "fighting words" [a small category of speech held to have no social value in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)]; 3) an interest in protecting the sensi-
bilities of passers-by; and 4) an interest in ensuring respect for the flag. Despite the
appearance of a balancing test, however, the Court emphasized the incitement aspect of
its analysis, found that Chaplinsky did not apply to the defendant's words, and gave
virtually no weight to the other two state interests. In effect, the Street approadl 1s tie
equivalent of the incitement test set forth in Brandenburg later that year.
47. Justice Frankfurter repeatedly urged that the balancing test be applied even to
the so-called "direct" cases where the content of the speech was the basis of governmental
restraint. A majority of the Court has not accepted this approach partially because recent
majorities have not espoused the degree of judicial deference to tile legislature in first
amendment cases which Frankfurter advocated. Even if the Court did apply the balancing
test to the "direct" cases, however, the important point is that such a test requires that
the content of the expression exist on a record in order to determine whether the govern-
mental interests in regulating that speech outweigh the value of the particular words.
Justice Frankfurter evidenced this approach in his Dennis concurrence. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-55 (1951) (concurrence). There, in balancing the expression-ad.
vocacy of government overthrow-against the interest of the state in preventing such over-
throw, Frankfurter deferred to the legislature's judgment that, in the existing political
milieu, the balance should tip against the right of speech. In so deferring, Frankfurter
explained that the Congress had determined that the defendants' speech presented a clear
and present danger and that this determination was sufficient. Indeed, the Dennis mai-
jority's version of the clear and present danger test was nearly a balancing test. See Note,
Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842, 847 n.16 (1969).
48. See Emerson, supra note 9, at 889:
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If expression must be considered in its context before the state may
constitutionally punish for it, both the expression and the context must
exist in some form in which a court can examine them. The first amend-
ment surely prohibits punishing an individual's commitment or stated
promise to engage in expression at any stage prior to that expression.
There is no reason to contemplate a different result when the com-
mitment to later expression is the agreement of several persons. The
fact that the legislature has called the agreement "conspiracy" and
designated it a crime is irrelevant. At such an inchoate stage, it is
simply impossible for courts to analyze the expression in the context
of its surrounding circumstances; they are left with mere conjecture-
hardly enough under Edwards.
This result is, of course, consistent with the Court's general principle
-first stated in Near v. Minnesota4'-that the first amendment pro-
hibits prior restraints of expression, that ideas must first reach the
market place before the state can intervene in any manner. The Near
Court itself, however, indicated that this doctrine was not absolute, "'
and there have been rare instances when the Court has sustained prior
restraints. The result in these cases, however, is rationalized by two
factors not present when conspiracy law is utilized to restrict incipient
expression.
First, prior restraints upheld in obscenity cases are justified by the
fact that the regulatory bodies enforcing the restraints have always
had adequate access to the expression concerned. In Times Film v.
City of Chicago5' the Court upheld a statute requiring prior submis-
sion of motion pictures to a governmental board for its determination
of the films' obscenity. In this case and in its few progeny, 2 the expres-
sion already existed on the record, and the Court could analyze the
Expression is itself not normally harmful, and the objective of the limitation is not
normally to suppress the communication as such. Those who seek to impzse limitation
on e xpression do so ordinarily in order to forestall some anticipated effect of ex-
pression in causing or influencing other conduct.
See also T. EMERSON, THE Svys ri OF FR.EDOM OF ExpRErssio 403.04 (1970), where the
author deals with expression as a form of solicitation, an inchoate offense. See also
Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 22, at 626-28.
49. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
50. The exceptions to the general rule against prior restraints were: (1) in wartime
certain dangerous speech might be curtailed; (2) obscene publications might also be sub-
ject to previous restraint; and (3) the security of the community life may be protected
against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government.
283 US. at 716. For a discussion of the problems raised by the Near Court's exceptions,
see Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 iAW CONTEmmP. Pa oD. 648 (1955).
51. 365 US. 43 (1961).
52. In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), the Court modified the Times Filmn
doctrine by requiring immediate judicial review of an adverse determination by a state
board of censors.
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expression in constitutional terms on its face because the first amend-
ment "tests" in the obscenity area are not based on the eliciting of any
specific response from any specific audience. 3 In non-obscenity cases,
however, it is difficult to justify prior restraints at all. Although the
Supreme Court has never sanctioned a prior restraint based on the
content of a proposed public speech, one court of appeals has sug-
gested that a public speaker may be enjoined from specified future
expression if his past speeches incited violence or unlawful activity
from a sympathetic audience. 4 Nevertheless, past forms of expression
do not offer courts the kind of record available in the obscenity case.
Whereas courts can scrutinize alleged obscenity prior to distribution,
in the public speaking cases there is normally no evidence of a speaker's
contemplated expression prior to his actual speech.55 And even if there
53. In theory, obscenity is a form of inchoacy in that it may be regulated because
of its reputed tendency to cause moral depravity in the society as a whole. See Roth v,
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Though in defining obscenity the Court claims to ask
whether the expression appeals to the prurient interests of a generalized community, the
specific audience response is never examined. Instead, once the expression Is defined as
obscene, it is said to have no social value, and there is no need to subject it to a clear
and present danger test, 854 US. at 484-487 (1957). Compare the Roth majority with
id. at 508 (Black, J. and Douglas, J., dissenting). The Court's definition of obscenity, how.
ever, is not at all dear. Whereas in Roth obscenity was defined as expression which ap.
pealed to the prurient interests of the national community, in Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463 (1965), the Court focused on the pandering aspect of the advertising rather
than on the content of the expression itself. The Court has used a similar "no social
value" approach when words constitute libel, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952),
commercial advertising, Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), and "fighting words,"
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 US. 568 (1942). By the Court's rationale, such words
are not really expression at all, and they may be regulated as if they were action.54. Kasper v. Britain, 245 .2d 92 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied .355 U.S. 834 (19.37). The
defendant arrived in Clinton, Tennessee, to urge lical citizens to ignore a federal court
order to integrate the local high school. After two days of inflammatory speeches andpicketing, city officials, fearful that Kasper's activities would incite violen'ce,, soughit andi
were granted an ex parte restraining order which the defendant soon violated. In tip-
holding Kasper's contempt conviction, however, the Sixth Circuit ignored the prior
restraint doctrine, finding it sufficient that Kasper's speeches, prior to and after the
restraining order, created a clear and present danger of volence. The "danger" n Kasper's
speeches arose because his audience was sympathetic and appeared likely to follow his
suggestion that they refuse to integrate the local school. No prior restraint could have
been upheld had Kaspers speeches tended to incite a hostile audience to violence. Se
Rockwell v. Moeis, 12 N.Y.2d 272 (1961); Kunz v. New York, 40 U.S. 290 (1951), Sea
generally Note, Free Speech and the Hostile Audience, 26 N.Y.UJ.L. Rnv. 389 (1951).
55. It is largely for this reason that the Kasper type of prior restraint Is Inconsistent
with the first amendment requirement that the contested expression exist on the record
before any regulation is permitted. While Rasper had indicated a strong likelihood that
he would repeat his inciteful speeches, a proper reading of Edwards and other Suprene
Court cases would seem to prohibit regulation of his intended expression until after the
pod spechod not b fyn a  alyd iendm eth e cnxofrthe su fderri ciur-
rerant d s .h te ermie onl wuhe ed expression, alfeant stn ilsome ni ul
f rm, Kssontarcod e p M onan Fit A n dmweent De Px rcs" 8 ignoreLd te 518,
su4gsti4 that~ I the abfsetncrae ofuhied exesonl subsuN prnistrent hould v
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were such evidence, it would be a rare case in which the context for
the proposed expression was so clear that the "independent examina-
tion" required under Edwards could be made. 0
Courts may uphold prior restraints, then, only when they have ade-
quate access to the contested expression and to the surrounding cir-
cumstances necessary to evaluate it. In this sense, such restraints are
actually not "prior," and do not strike at expression in its more in-
choate stages. This is a far cry from a conspiracy indictment leveled
against individuals at the stage where they have merely agreed to en-
gage in future expression; in such circumstances the court has no
foundation for determining that the proposed expression is unlawful.
The second factor present in judicially approved prior restraints
is that they are civil restraints-permit refusalsG7 or injunctionsr-
rather than prior criminal punishment for future expression. While
violation of the restraint may lead to contempt proceedings, the re-
straint itself never reaches the form of criminal punishment inherent
in any conspiracy conviction.
A criminal conspiracy conviction is thus qualitatively different from
any prior restraint that has received judicial sanction. In upholding
some forms of prior restraints, the courts have never implied that
criminal punishment at an extremely inchoate stage of expression is
consistent with the first amendment.5 9 Since prosecution of a group
for conspiracy to advocate prior to the actual advocacy is a prior re-
straint upon expression, the first amendment dictates that the govern-
be the only means of regulating expression which poses a "dear and present danger" to
society.
The Kasper result is improper on procedural grounds as well, for the district court had
issued an ex parte restraining order against the defendant's future speech, something the
Supreme Court has recently held to be improper. See Carrol v. President and Commis-
sioners of Princess Ann, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
56. In Rockwell v. Morris, 12 N.Y.2d 272, 282-83 (1961), the New York Court of Appeals,
in one of the most exhaustive judicial studies of the prior restraint doctrine, noted that
prior restraints on public speeches were only proper in the "very rare case" where it
could be established on a "proper record" that the proposed expression would fall outside
the protection of the first amendment. The court took care to point out that past ex-
pression could not suffice as evidence that future expression would be unlawful. The court
mplied that a prior restraint could only be sustained if the court had access to the
text of the proposed speech as well as a clear indication of how the audience would react.
57. See, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 US. 395 (1953); Kunz v. New York, M0
US. 290 (1951).
58. See, e.g., Carrol v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, S93 US. 175
(1968).
59. The only judicial view of conspiracy as a prior restraint is that of Justice Black
dissenting in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951). He read the indictment
as preceding any advocacy on the part of the conspirators: "No matter how it is worded,
this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I believe the First
Amendment forbids." Id. at 579.
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ment wait until the agreed upon expression has reached fruition before
prosecuting.6"
III.
While it may be clear that the first amendment prohibits indictments
for conspiracy to advocate prior to the actual advocacy, this principle
offers little "breathing room" for controversial expressive and associ-
ational rights because the vast majority of conspiracy prosecutions
begin after the conspirators have completed their desired objective.01
The reasons underlying this principle, however, support a broader
rule. Whenever the objective is unlawful expression, the first amend-
ment should bar the use of conspiracy law whether the objective has
been accomplished or not.
Though at bottom the constitutional claim against conspiracy law
as applied to expressive combinations is one of overbreadth and its
concomitant "chilling effect," the initial part of this claim relies on
the vagueness of the offense called "conspiracy to engage in unlawful
expression" and thus sounds of due process. The vagueness of the crime
60. Restrictions on expression in its incipiency are unconstitutional, at least in part, for
the due process reason that prior punishment may not attach at a point where ft Is not
clear to the potential offender that the contemplated expression will be a crime. The same
argument could presumably be made about other offenses in which it is not clear until
the commission of the act that it will constitute a crime. For example, since resistance or
lack of consent by the victim is a necessity for a rape conviction, one could argue oil due
process grounds that a conviction for an incipient stage of rape (e.g., conspiracy to rape)
is invalid because the aggressor could not tell until the moment of penetration whether
or not the victim will "consent" in the legal sense.
Despite this similarity, prior restraints of expression raise serious issues of social policy
not at all involved in the non-expression crimes. Procedures used to regulate expression
are subject to a much stricter standard of precision and fairness than are procedures used
to regulate other conduct because of the importance of expression in a denoratlc
society. For example, in Speiser v. Randall, 357 US. 513 (1958), the Court held unconstl-
tutional a statute denying a veterans' tax exemption to advocates of government overthrow
because the statute placed the burden of demonstrating non-advocacy on the applicant.
The Court stated:
The vice of the present procedure is that, where particular speech falls close to the
line separating the lawful and the unlawful, the possibility of mistaken fact-finding-
inherent in all litigation-will create the danger that the legitimate utterance Avill
be penalized.
Id. at 526. A similarly difficult burden of proof confronts the potential speaker prose-
cuted prior to his expression; he must, in effect, prove that his advocacy would not have
been unlawful had it been allowed to take place.
Unlike prior restraints on other conduct, prior restraints on expression also stand In
stark contradiction to the uniform trend of antipathy for censorship that wa it prime
impetus for the framing of the first amendment. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior
Restraint, 20 LAw & CozErEMxp. PROB. 648, 650 (1955). It may well be that the framners
intended the sole purpose of the first amendment's free speech clause to be the pre-
vention of censorship and prior restraints. See Z. CHArm, FIa=s SyracH IN Tr UNIt
STATEs 9-12 (1941).
61. See Developments, supra note 19, at 949.
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of conspiracy serves to inhibit individuals from expressing themselves
and from associating with those who propose to engage in controversial
expression in the future.6 2 The legal concept of the conspiratorial
agreement is loosely stated, and usually proved by circumstantial evi-
dence such that
an accused might be found in a net of conspiracy by reason of the
relation of his acts to the acts of others, the significance of which
he may not have appreciated and which may result from the appli-
cation of criteria more delicate than those which determine guilt
as to the usual substantive offense.m
The difficulty in defining the agreement and determining which
persons "agreed" in the legal sense is a serious dilemma in all conspiracy
cases, but when the conspiratorial objective is expression the vagueness
is multiplied by the vagueness of the highly ad hoc first amendment
tests themselves. It is almost impossible to determine, prior to the
occurrence of the advocacy, whether the proposed expression will be
illegal precisely because the Court's tests base a determination of con-
stitutional illegality on the nature of the expression and the response
it is likely to elicit under the circumstances. At the agreement stage,
then, an individual might be unaware both that he is involving himself
in a conspiracy and that the purpose of it is illegal."4
It has been argued persuasively that every vagueness decision in the
first amendment area is based on an overbreadth rationale.05 The due
process vagueness and first amendment overbreadth doctrines are based
in part on the belief that an amorphously stated offense category tends
to deter perfectly legitimate-and in the free speech area, constitution-
62. In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 US. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court explained that
the threatened application of a vague and overbroad law in the first amendment area
inhibits persons from expressing themselves lawfully or from associating with others
and thus creates a "chilling effect" thereby violating the first amendment.
63. Von Moltke v. Gilles, 332 U.S. 703, 728 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also
Cousens, Agreement as an Element in Conspiracy, 23 VA. L. RE%. 898 (1937). The author
there notes that the definition of "agreement" has lost its shape largely because of the
emphasis on the subordinate factors which may tend to prove association rather than
on agreement to a common plan. Also, the judicially sympathetic application of conspiracy
law in antitrust cases may have caused much of the vagueness of the term "conspiratorial
agreement." See Developments, supra note 19, at 1000.
64. Professor A. Goldstein has written:
If the prohibited purpose is clearly set forth in the conspiracy statute, the difficulties
are solely those involved in applying the concept of an agreement. When ...the
unlawful purpose is vaguely stated the contours of "conspiracy" become ever more
vague, and the dividing line between intent, now designated "purpose," and act, now
termed "agreement," tends to disappear.
Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 407 (1959).
65. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L
Rv. 67 (1960).
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ally protected-conduct. 6 At issue in the case of conspiracy law is the
effect that its use has on persons contemplating controversial but pro-
tected expression and association, and surely Judge Coffin is right that
the effect is "a pronounced chilling effect-indeed that of a subzero
blast-on all kinds of efforts to sway public opinion."67
Conspiracy law, when applied to associations engaged in expression,
is overbroad because it can and does reach persons who have not them-
selves engaged in any illegal expression. Conspiracy law achieves this
phenomenon by requiring only that the conspirators have "specific
intent" to further the aims of the agreement."8 Once the prosecution
has proved a conspiratorial agreement and an overt act in pursuance
thereof, it must also show that the particular defendant intended to
advance the criminal end.69 But, as Judge Coffin pointed out in Spoch,
"specific intent" is often based on extremely ambiguous factors. The
Spock majority explained that specific intent to further the aims of the
conspiracy could be demonstrated by any of the following: (1) that the
defendant had, prior to or after the accomplishment of the conspirato-
rial objective, made "unambiguous" statements in support of that ob-
jective; (2) that the defendant had himself engaged in the accomplished
conspiratorial objective; or (3) that the defendant had acted legally as
a clear means of rendering effective the conspiratorial objective.10 With
specific intent thus defined, conspiracy law presents serious first amend-
ments problems when the conspiratorial objective is unlawful expres-
sion.
66. In the first amendment cases, the problem of vagueness tends to merge into tile
problem of overbreadth, and the two doctrines are frequently used interchangeably. In
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 880 U.S. 479, 494 (1965), the Court combined vagueness and
overbreadth to formulate the "chilling effect" doctrine. See Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAnv. L. REv. 844, 873-75 (1970). Overbroad laws regulating
speech create a "chilling effect" by deterring protected expression along with unprotected
expression, effectively preventing expression which should be encouraged. Such laws may
also be vague, leaving the individual who contemplates expression uncertain whether his
proposed expression will fall within the ambit of the statute. As a result, the individual
will "tend to leave utterances unsaid." Note, The Yoid-]or-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 76 (1960).
67. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 188 (1st Cir. 1969).
68. See Scales v. United States, 567 US. 203 (1961). The Scales defendants were con-
victed under the membership clause of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2885. The Court held
that the clause-and the Constitution-permits the punishment of "active members" of
the Communist Party. Active membership, however, can only be proved by showing that
a defendant had both knowledge of the illegal goals of the organization as well ais"'specific intent" to advance the illegal goals of the organization. As such, the majority
admitted "there is no great difference between a charge of being a member in a group
which engages in criminal conduct and being a member of a large conspiracy." 867 U.S.
at 226.
69. See Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 22, at 968.
70. 416 F.2d at 173. The Spoct majority relied on, inter alia, Scales v. United States,
867 U.S. 203 (1961), and Nowak v. United States, 856 U.S. 660, 665-68 (1958), In support
of its three-part "specific intent" test for political conspiracy cases.
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In his dissent Judge Coffin was particularly troubled by the majority's
specific intent test:
What are the implications of the three methods of activating one's
signature to the "Call" to status as a full-fledged conspirator? To
say that prior or subsequent unambiguous statements change the
color of the litmus is to say that while one exercise of the First
Amendment rights is protected, two are not .... To say "sub-
sequent legal acts dearly undertaken for rendering effective the
advocated illegal action" .., renders retrospectively conspiratorial
the earlier protected ambiguous advocacy is to say that two rights
make a wrong.71
Judge Coffin apparently regarded the words of the agreement, standing
alone, as protected expression which became unprotected only upon a
showing that a defendant's lawful statements or acts, subsequent to the
agreement, established unambiguous support for the agreement's ob-
jectives. Thus two acts of protected expression combined to entwine
an individual, through a "delayed fuse approach,"7-2 in criminal
conduct.
But Judge Coffin's analysis is plainly contrary to traditional con-
spiracy doctrine under which the agreement itself is not protected
expression, but the basis of the crime. The requirement of specific
intent is imposed merely to ensure that "passive" members of the
group will not be convicted. Nevertheless, when the conspiratorial
objective is unlawful expression, a delayed fuse effect is created by the
specific intent test. If, as argued above, 73 the legality of an agreement to
engage in expression cannot be determined until the expression ac-
tually occurs, a defendant cannot know at the time of the agreement
whether the association is an unlawful conspiracy.74 Neither his unam-
biguous statements nor his lawful acts subsequent to the agreement
will render the association unlawful. Thus, his participation becomes
discernibly unlawful only upon the subsequent expression of another
person, and this "delayed fuse" phenomenon may have a pronounced
chilling effect upon those who might seek to associate with persons
whose political views are controversial and provocative.
Where a statute which impinges upon first amendment freedoms
serves an admittedly legitimate state purpose, the Court has frequently
71. 416 F.2d at 187 (dissent).
72. Id. at 18.
73. See pp. 880-84 supra.
74. See note 14 supra. The First Amendment dearly forbids the legislature from
making it an offense to agree to engage in lawful expression.
887
The Yale Law Journal
inquired whether a "less drastic means" of regulation might fully
achieve the stated purpose.75 If the purpose can be achieved without
abridging protected activity, the state interests in any broader means
of regulation carries very slight weight in the constitutional balance.
The legitimate state interest in a statute which punishes conspiracies
to engage in unlawful expression is the prevention of whatever con-
sequences are believed to flow from the proscribed expression. If it be
conceded that conspiracy law cannot reach an agreement to advocate
prior to the actual advocacy,76 this legitimate state interest can be
achieved simply by prosecuting for the advocacy without the use of the
overbroad conspiracy weapon.
Punishing the expression rather than the agreement would, of course,
preclude criminal liability for those who had participated in the agree-
ment but not the advocacy and those who had urged others to speak
but had not done so themselves. But it is precisely these people against
whom the use of the conspiracy weapon is illegitimate, for those who
contemplate future expression or who urge others to engage in future
expression cannot know-given the vagueness of the substantive law
of conspiracy and the ad hoc nature of the Court's tests in the first
amendment area-whether their conduct will form the basis of a con-
spiracy conviction under current doctrine.
Another possible state interest in the conspiracy device might be
found in -the general danger rationale. Under the common law general
danger notion, it will be recalled, the conspiratorial agreement was
said to be punishable because the combination spawned an extensive
anxiety in society.77 Putting aside the question whether there be any
empirical basis for this assumption, it might be remarked that an ap-
prehension as to the content and effect of future expression is an essen-
tial feature of a society which endorses freedom of speech. Because
unlawful expression is itself an inchoate crime, an agreement to engage
in expression is, by definition, twice removed from any harm govern.
ment can constitutionally seek to prevent. At this level of multiple
75. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960):
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must
be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
See also N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 US. 415, 433 (1963); Note, Legislative Inquiry into
Political Activity: First Amendment Immunity from Committee Investigation, 65 YALt
L.J. 1159, 1174-75 (1956). But see Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78
YAmLj. 464 (1969), for a critique of the Court's formulation of the "less drastic means"
doctrine.
76. See pp. 883-84 supra.
77. See p. 876 supra.
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inchoacy, society has no cognizable reason for anxiety; in fact, if the
values underlying the first amendment are to be served, a democratic
society should encourage the controversial political associations that
might be "chilled" if conspiracy law is applied in this area.
The Model Penal Code version of the general danger rationale is
equally unjustified in this class of cases.78 Punishing a defendant for
both the agreement and the completed crime if the conspiracy has crim-
inal purposes beyond the crimes already accomplished is impermissible
for the same reasons that a conspiracy indictment cannot be brought
prior to the occurrence of the expression which is the purpose of the
conspiracy.79 A rationale adopted to provide a weapon against organized
crime should have no place in "combatting" free expression and as-
sociation.
The general danger rationale asserts a state interest in the use
of conspiracy law against defendants who have not themselves engaged
in unlawful expression and who therefore could not be prosecuted for
the completed offense.80 Prosecuting only for unlawful expression
rather than for conspiracy, however, is also a less drastic means for
regulating those who, under the "specific object" rationale alone, could
be punished either for conspiracy or for the completed offense.8 ' First
amendment principles thus suggest that the conspiracy should be
"merged" into the substantive offense in this class of cases., 2
78. See p. 877 supra.
79. The Model Penal Code version of the general danger rationale for conspirac in
this class of cases suffers from the same problems inherent in any prior restraint of ex-
pression. Just as it is improper to regulate an individual's future expression based on
evidence of his past unlawful expression, see notes 54-56 supra, it is also improper to
metamorphize an agreement to engage in expression into a "general danger" because
past speeches were unlawful.
80. The general danger rationale is also the justification for punishing those who ia~e
participated in the substantive offense for both the conspiracy and the completed crime.
See note 25 supra.
81. The general danger rationale being outweighed by first amendment considerations,
this leaves the specific object rationale as the remaining justification for conspiracy law
n this class of cases. Under that rationale, the government may prosecute those who have
engaged in the unlawful speech either for conspiracy or for the completed crime, but
not for both. See note 23 supra. This is because under the specific object rationale alone,
the conspiracy should be treated like an attempt. However, referece to the law of
attempts provides no principled guidance to the proper theoretical resolution of the ques-
tion of which offense to prosecute. Some jurisdictions allow punishment for eithee the
attempt or the completed crime while others permit prosecution only for the substantive
offense. (This latter phenomenon is often called "merger"; the inchoate stage is "merged"
into the completed offense.) See People v. Wasserbach, 5-1 N..S.2d 02., 310 (Kings County
Ct. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 271 App. Div. 756, 64 N.YS.2d 703 (19-16). See also
Remington & Joseph, Charging, Convicting and Sentencing the Multiple Criminal Of-
fender, 1961 Wis. L. R1y. 528 (1961); Sobel, The Anticipatory Offenses in the New Penal
Law: Solicitation, Conspiracy, Attempt and Facilitation, 32 BRooKLYN L. RtV. 257 (1960).
82. It is, of course, far more logical to prosecute those w'ho haie engaged in the un-
lawful expression for that expression and not for the agreement simply because the focus
of the trial will be on the expression and the response of the audience.
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A conspiracy trial burdens the defendants with serious procedural
disadvantages theoretically warranted because it is normally difficult
to prove the existence of an agreement.8 3 When the conspiratorial
objective is unlawful expression which has been accomplished, the
justification for utilizing the complex procedures inherent in a con-
spiracy trial disappears.8 4 The government may not claim that convic-
tion for conspiracy will permit greater punishment than conviction for
the substantive offense because, under the specific object rationale
alone, the inchoate stage of criminal conduct cannot logically be graded
higher than the completed crime s0
In the absence of any legitimate justifications for employing the
sweeping procedures of a conspiracy trial, the first amendment requires
that the government pursue the equally effective, but less drastic means
of punishing those who engage in unlawful expression for the expres-
sion itself and not for the prior agreement.80
IV.
The optimal, and perhaps the only effective, method of judicial
surveillance of the use of conspiracy law to police unlawful expression
is to articulate principled per se rules. It may be that the formulation
83. See p. 877 supra.
84. The complex procedures of a conspiracy trial make it more difficult for an In-
dividual defendant to establish his innocence. See pp. 877-78 supra. The Supreme Court's
concern for procedural protections in first amendment cases in Speiser is particularly
relevant on this score:
[Slince the validity of a restraint on speech in each case depends on careful analysis
of the particular circumstances, the procedures by which the facts of the case are ad-
judicated are of special importance and the validity of the restraint may turn on
the sateguards which they afford.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 521 (1958).
85. See Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 22, at 1022-23, 1026-28. Under the specific
object rationale alone, the inchoate offense is treated as an attempt.
86. See Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 469
(1969):
Any sensible construction of the first amendment would forbid a legislature [and
hence a prosecutor] to go out of its way to inhibit expression either by design or
accident, and the choice of the harsher or equally effective means suggests that sup.
pression of speech was the legislature's (or prosecutor's) real purpose from the start.
In effect, then, the first amendment requires that the inchoate aspects of the offense
merge into the completed unlawful expression. The doctrine of merger In conspiracy
cases existed at common law-merger was required if the substantive offense was a felony
and the conspiracy a misdemeanor. In such cases, the prosecutor could charge the defen.
dant only for the completed crime. However, when the conspiracy was a felony, merger
was prohibited. The significant procedural differences between trials for misdemeanor
and for felony gave sustenance to this rule. Since these differences no longer exist, the
common law doctrine of merger has generally been abandoned. See Developments, supra
note 19, at 968-69. See also Note, Merger of Misdemeanor into Executed Felony, INl
COLum. L. REv. 708 (1931). While trial procedures no longer compel merger , It Is sug.
gested here that first amendment principles do.
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of rules does enhance the "legal mystique" of the Constitution and
-courts, thus insulating the judiciary somewhat from the high political
passions particularly characteristic in this area and from the devastating
impact of such passions on first amendment freedoms. But the far more
compelling reasons for the application of per se rules here are to reduce
the uncertainty of scope-and, thus, the dissent-deterring potential-
now endemic to conspiracy law, and to discourage the legislature and
executive from repeated and novel attempts to suppress expressive and
associational group conduct.8 7 Based on the analysis in the preceding
sections of this Note, three rules may be articulated to conform the
use of conspiracy law to the principles of the First Amendment.
The first rule is merely a summary of the conclusions from the pre-
vious analysis: The first amendment prohibits conspiracy indictments
alleging agreements to engage in any form of expression.
The sole inquiry a court need make under this rule is whether
the alleged conspiratorial objective is expression.s The fact that a
trial judge can enforce the rules simply by analyzing the government's
complaint means that the inestimable damage to a political group
which may result from a time-consuming conspiracy trial will be pre.
vented where the government does not have a constitutionally valid
conspiracy case. As the Court said in Dombrowski v. Pfister:
[T]he chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights
may derive from the fact of prosecution unaffected by the prospects
of its success or failure.8 9
In effect, what is suggested here is a pleading rule which precludes
the government from indicting individuals for conspiracy to engage
87. "The one clear virtue of per se rules is certainty." Note, Civil Disabilities and the
First Amendment, 78 YALE: J. 842, 851 n.39 (1969). In the first amendment area espe-
dally, the certainty inherent in per se rules is essential if individuals are to enjoy the
rights of free speech and assodation. For a well researched discussion of the Supreme
Court's gradual movement away from interest balancing toward per se rules where civil
disabilities threatened to encroach upon first amendment freedoms, see id.
88. When the government charges a group with conspiring to advocate government
overthrow or conspiring to incite riot, it is indicting these persons for their agreement
to engage in what the government believes to be unlawful expression. The trial judge,
however, need make no determination as to whether the expression is indeed unlavful
when measured against one of the First Amendment tests. Instead, the mere fact that
the conspiratorial objective is expression is determinative for the purpose of dismissing
the indictment.
89. 580 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). Judge Coffin's five-part "outer limits" are too vague to
provide this type of insulation from the burdens of litigation. Individuals desirous of
expressing themselves could not know with any certainty whether their conduct could
be labeled "conspiratorial." No trial court could determine from an indictment alone
whether the facts of a particular case warranted protection from a conspiracy trial, and
the very fact of such a trial may do excessive damage to first amendment freedoms. See
note 6 supra.
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in unlawful expression. At the same time, however, the pleading rule
embodies a proscription that should influence the prosecutorial decision
to seek indictments as well as the grand jury's willingness to indict.
The government is left to prosecute each individual for the separate
offense of illegal expression. 0
While the first rule would render invalid a great many of the indict-
ments under which associational expression has been punished in the
past, its defect is that it may easily be avoided by bringing indictments
which charge action as the purpose of the conspiracy and use expression
to prove the overt acts and specific intent of each defendant.9 1
To prevent such circumvention, courts should analyze the overt acts
alleged in the conspiracy indictment to determine whether the non-
expressive objective was achieved, or was to be achieved, by means of
expression. This task would not be difficult where the objective has
already taken place. For example, in People v. Epton9 2 the defendant
was charged with, inter alia, conspiracy to riot. Not only had the riot
already taken place, but there was no evidence that the defendant had
himself participated in violent conduct. The overt acts indicated only
that the defendant had engaged in what the court found to be unlawful
90. In theory, this rule would also rejuire the dismissal of a conspiracy indictment
if the conspiratorial objective were the kind of action which the Court has treated as
symbolic speech. Though the Court has never set forth a standard for defining symbolic
speech, it has frequently held that action is so interrelated with expression as to merit
first amendment protection. For example, in Stromberg v. California, 283 US. 359 (1931),
the Court held that the first amendment protected waving a red flag. In State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (19,13), the Court held the flag salute to be a
"form of utterance." In Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966), sit-ins were held to be
protected expression, and in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969), the Court treated wearing a black armband as akin to "pure speech."
Presumably, once the Court finds that action is symbolic speech, that action should war-
rant first amendment protection from direct regulation unless it creates a clear and
present danger or incites others to violence. However, the Court has not followed this
approach but has instead applied a balancing test in this area even where the symbolic
speech comes under direct governmental regulation. See. e.g., United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968), where the Court, assuming arguendo that draft card burning was a
form of symbolic speech, went on to uphold a criminal regulation of such conduct be-
cause it claimed that the regulation impinged on the first amendment only indirectly.
Until the Court enunciates a means of defining symbolic speech, it will be dilikult to
insulate such conduct from conspiracy indictments. However, it is clear that If the objec-
tive of a conspiracy amounts to action which the Court has already labeled "symbolic
speech," then the conspiracy charge should be dismissed. For suggested principles by
which the Court might classify action as speech and non-speech, see Note, Symbolio
Conduct, 68 COLTJI. L. REv. 1091 (1968).
91. For example, rather than charge a conspiracy to advocate government overthrow,
the prosecution might allege a conspiracy to overthrow the government; the prosecution
would then use expression as evidence of the overt acts and as evidence of each defen-
dant's specific intent. This was Justice Jackson's view of the Dennis prosecution, though
this is not what the government had charged. See Dennis v. United States, 341 US. 491,
561-79 (concurring opinion).
92. 19 N.Y.2d 496, 281 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 29 (1968).
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forms of expression, as well as action incidental to that expression, 3 as
a means of inciting the riot.
When the non-expressive objective of an alleged conspiracy has not
yet been accomplished, the court's approach should be similar. The
overt acts may illustrate that, until the time of the indictment, the
defendants had only engaged in expression as a means of furthering
the as yet unaccomplished conspiratorial objective. For example, in
Schenck v. United States4 the indictment charged the defendants with,
inter alia, conspiring to cause insubordination in the armed forces.
The overt acts indicated that the defendants had attempted to achieve
their objective by publishing and distributing literature -which the
Court found to be unlawful.
This second rule may be stated thus: if the overt acts indicate that
a non-expressive conspiratorial objective was achieved, or was to be
achieved, solely by means of expression and action incidental to that
expression, the court should pierce the form of the indictment, inter-
pret the conspiratorial objective as unlawful expression, and dismiss
the conspiracy charge. The government is then left to prosecute each
defendant for the separate offense of illegal expression. 5 The purpose
This second rule may be stated thus: if the overt acts indicate that
of the second rule, then, is to ensure the operation of the first: con-
only offense is expression.
93. Since the overt act requirement is purely a formalit), see note 41 supra, the
prosecution might allege some non-expressive overt acts along with. the exprcssie overt
acts. In such a case, the court should consider whether the non-expressive overt acts
are merely incidental or subordinate to the expressive overt acts. For example, the con-
struction of a platform for public speakers is incidental to the later public speeches,
the printing of leaflets is incidental to the resulting literature, and the organizing of
a meeting is incidental to the speeches later delivered at that meeting. In such cases,
the overt acts, when considered together would indicate that the defendants intended
to achieve their objective by means of expression and nothing more.
94. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
95. At the time of the indictment, the government might attempt to establish that
the unachieved objective had been attempted by means of expression but would, in the
future, be attempted by means of action as well. If the defendants have not indicated
such future conduct except by means of expression (presumably reflective of their intent),
the rule suggested here precludes the government from prosecuting for conspiracy'. In-
stead, the government must wait until the group conduct moves out of the realm of
expression and into action. See T. EmEsoN, THE Sysru.r or FRnEwot oF ExrnE5to.v
409-11 (1970). Such a rule is the product of a balance between the government's lons in
such a case and the greater loss to freedom of expression which results %hen conspiracy
law is used against persons who have only engaged in expression. Once the conspiracy
moves out of pure expression, however, the third rule comes into play. See TAN 97-105
infra.
96. The first and second rules would require the dismissal of the entire indictment
in the Spock case. That indictment charged the five defendants with conspiring to
"counsel, aid and abet" draft resistance. Thus, the expre~sive objective and the action
objectives were lumped together in one count. Compare People v. Epton, 19 N.Y.2d 496,
281 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 29 (196S), where the defendant was charged
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When the non-expressive objective of a group has been accomplished
or attempted by means of both expression and action not incidental
to that expression, neither the first rule nor the second rule require
dismissal of the indictment. Unless restrictions are placed on the use of
conspiracy law in such cases, however, an individual might still find
himself involved in a conspiracy trial merely because of his ideas. Since
the agreement is rarely susceptible to direct proof,9 7 the fact of an in-
dividual's association with a group engaged in unlawful action may
be sufficient to establish his agreement.98 Furthermore, his specific
intent could be established merely by "unambiguous statements" in
support of this unlawful action99 even if such expression, standing
alone, would merit constitutional protection.100 Even where a defen-
dant has engaged in unlawful action as well as speech, the use of con-
stitutionally protected public expression may be so prejudicial in the
minds of the jury that the defendant could be convicted for his ideas
rather than for his acts.
To prevent the use of conspiracy law to convict individuals on the
basis of their ideas, courts should bar the use of constitutionally pro-
tected public expression as evidence either of an overt act or of an
individual's specific intent. 0' The chilling effect caused by the use of
protected expression as evidence in a conspiracy trial is the same as
that which flows from prosecuting an individual for the speech itself.
Justice Douglas recognized this fact in his dissent in Epton v. New
York: 02
in three separate counts: conspiracy to advocate riot, conspiracy to riot, and unlawful
advocacy. In Spock, the first rule would require the immediate dismissal of the con-
spiracy to counsel" part of the indictment. Under the second rule, the rest of the in-
dictment would be dismissed because the overt acts all illustrated that the defendant
were aiding and abetting draft resistance through means of expression and action In-
cidental to that expression. Under the first and second rule the conspiracy lndlctmento
in the Epton case would also be dismissed.
97. See p. 877 supra.
98. See notes 36, 63 supra; see also United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 187 (1st Cir,
1969) (Coffin, J., dissenting); Esco Corporation v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000 (1965), anld
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942).
99. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 173 (1st Cir. 1969).
100. Professor Emerson has written:
Only a rule that a member cannot be punished for the illegal activities of his organi-
zation unless he himself participates in them can be reconciled with the demands of
the First Amendment.
T. ErimsoN, Tim Sys=rxa oF FPMOM OF EXPRESSION 129 (1970). The third rule to be
suggested here, however, would not go so far; a member of a group engaged in unlawful
action would be protected to the extent that his constitutionally protected expression
could not, at a later time, be used against him.
101. To determine whether the public expression sought to be introduced as evidence
is constitutionally protected, the court should apply the current incitement test employed
by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See note 43 supra.
If the expression is found likely to have incited lawless action, then under this third rule
it would be admissible. In all other cases it would be excluded.
102. 390 U.S. 29 (1968).
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[T]he use of constitutionally protected activities to provide the
overt acts for conspiracy convictions might well stifle dissent and
cool the fervor of those with whom society does not agree at the
moment.,0 3
While the other members of the Court have not responded to this view,
in United States v. Johnson'0 the Court held that the overt acts in a
conspiracy cannot include speech protected by the speech and debate
clause. The Court reasoned that the use of constitutionally protected
speech would tend to deter Congressmen from unfettered expression
on the floor of their respective houses. The use of expression protected
by the first amendment would have the same chilling effect on in-
dividual citizens.
If the first amendment bars the use of protected public expression
as overt acts in a conspiracy, then such expression should also be barred
as evidence of a defendant's specific intent. Since the requirement of
an overt act may be met by the slightest proof, the government could
delete the expressive overt acts from the indictment and nevertheless
use that evidence during the trial. If the only evidence of a defendant's
specific intent is constitutionally protected speech, the danger is too
great that an individual will be punished merely for his ideas and his
association with a controversial group. And, if the government has
other evidence to establish a defendant's specific intent, the use of
constitutionally protected expression would normally be both sur-
plusage and prejudicial. 05
103. Id. at 32 (dissent).
104. 383 US. 169 (1966). The government prosecuted and convicted a United States
Congressman with others for conspiracy to defraud the United States. One of the overt
acts consisted of a speech the Congressman had delivered on the floor of the House of
Representatives.
105. There may be cases where a defendant's protected expression is critical to
establishing his specific intent because the other evidence of his actions, standing alone,
is not convincing. But if this other evidence is so inconclusive, the defendant's conviction
could rest primarily on what he once correctly perceived as protected speech. In Street
v. New York, 594 US. 576 (1969), the Supreme Court rather obliquely implied that such
a conviction would be improper. There the defendant had made a brief speech against
racism while burning an American flag. He was indicted under a state law making it
a crime to hold in contempt, by word or deed, the flag of the United States. Finding the
speech protected because it had not threatened to incite violence, the Court revered.
the conviction on the grounds that the defendant could have been convicted for his ideas
alone. Though the Court went on to explain that its decision did not prohibit the govern-
ment from using protected expression to establish the elements of an action offense,
Justice White, in dissent, carefully pointed out that the Court's reasoning contradicted
its subsequent disclaimer. See Street v. New York, 594 U.S. 576, 615 n.3 (1969) (White, J.,dissenting).
Under the third rule suggested in this Note the prosecution is req[uired to investigate
further in order to produce reasonably convincing evidence of specific intent other than
the defendant's protected public expression.
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